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a b s t r a c t
Theory suggests a range of technological characteristics that might interact with the
business cycle depending on what kind of shocks or propagation mechanisms are
quantitatively important. We use variation in industry growth within manufacturing to
determine which technological characteristics interact significantly with the business
cycle. We find that growth in labor intensive industries is especially sensitive to
contractions. We show this cross-industry asymmetry occurs specifically in contractions,
not in recoveries nor over the cycle in general.
& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many theories explore the causes of the business cycle—theories of the shocks that trigger booms and contractions, and
theories of propagation or amplification mechanisms that lead these shocks to have significant macroeconomic impact. It is
thus critical for macroeconomics to identify the shocks or propagation mechanisms that are most empirically relevant for
understanding the business cycle. Resolving this problem tells us about the structure of the business cycle, and about which
class of models should be used for the analysis of stabilization policy.3
This paper identifies the shocks and propagation mechanisms that drive the business cycle by studying which
technological characteristics lead industries to grow disproportionately slowly during contractions, and by studying how
the most cyclical industries respond to contractions. We thus perform the first systematic empirical study of the
technological features of producers that interact most significantly with macroeconomic conditions. We focus on
contractions because, as we shall see, our results indicate that significant technology-cycle interactions appear during
contractions, and not at other times.
To narrow down the most empirically relevant technological factors that lead different industries to suffer disproportio-
nately in contractions, we rank industries along a variety of dimensions based on their technology of production. We also
use data from a large number of countries, which gives our results global coverage and which also allows us to study the
structure of contractions by exploiting country differences in industry growth.
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We cast a broad net regarding the technological factors that theory suggests might underlie a producer's vulnerability to
economic contractions. For example, if shocks to investment-specific technical progress are important drivers of the
business cycle, capital-intensive producers might be the most cyclical, and labor-intensive producers the least cyclical.
Alternatively, there could be propagation/amplification mechanisms that impact certain producers more than others. For
example, the financial accelerator mechanism – whereby a producers' ability to borrow depends both on the state of the
business cycle and on the collateralizability of their assets4 – might affect producers based on their reliance on inalienable
human capital or on specific physical capital. Thus, understanding which technological characteristics lead producers to be
sensitive to economic contractions informs us about the shocks that cause them and also about the mechanisms that lead
negative shocks to have significant macroeconomic effects. At the same time, given the plethora of business cycle theories
regarding shocks and propagation or amplification mechanisms, it is not straightforward to map between any particular
technological interaction and any given theory. Thus, seeing how producers with different technological characteristics
respond to contractions will be highly informative too. For example, whether the producers that suffer most in contractions
display price inertia informs us about the importance of price rigidities as a propagation mechanism of the business cycle. If
the producers that suffer most in contractions display disproportionately low productivity yet do not adjust input use, this
indicates that those industries must experience a particularly severe input adjustment cost of some kind.
This exercise requires a definition of “technology.” Since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982), theoretical business
cycle analysis is commonly performed within the context of models of economic growth. Thus, we follow the conventions of
growth theory by defining “technology” in terms of the production function. We identify industry differences in the
production technology using factor intensities, or using the qualitative attributes of factors of production, a strategy that
dates back to at least Cobb and Douglas (1928). In this way, for example, inherent differences between the technology for
producing Electrical Machinery (ISIC 383) and the technology for producing Wood Products (ISIC 331) can be described in
terms of the former being more R&D-intensive and less labor-intensive than the latter. Our technology indicators include
measures of labor intensity, human capital intensity, R&D intensity, intermediate intensity, asset fixity, capital depreciation,
the industry rate of investment-specific technical progress, and the specificity of the inputs used in each industry. We
measure them using US data, employing the assumption in Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) and
others that observed technological choices in the United States are indicative of how firms would organize their production
in a relatively undistorted and unconstrained environment – an assumption we discuss in detail.
We find that, compared to normal times, industries that are highly labor-intensive experience disproportionately slow
growth during contractions. This occurs whether we measure industry growth using value added, gross output or
production indices: thus the finding is very robust. When we distinguish between the initial impact of the shock that
starts a contraction and the subsequent propagation periods (identified by comparing the first period of the contraction
with the remainder), we do not find evidence that the shocks that trigger contractions have an asymmetric effect on
industries. Our results then indicate the presence of a propagation or amplification mechanism that is responsible for the
asymmetric impact of contractions, or of a highly persistent shock.
Furthermore, the manner in which these industries respond to contractions is informative as to the mechanisms that
propagate macroeconomic shocks. First, the behavior of prices in contractions is inconsistent with theories where nominal
rigidities play an important role in business cycle propagation. Second, labor intensive industries display low labor
productivity and respond to contractions by disproportionately lowering employment, although not by disproportionately
lowering investment. Since we find investment declines in all industries during contractions, this indicates that labor-
intensive firms want to preserve their physical capital in spite of their disproportionately low productivity, suggesting some
sort of capital adjustment cost which, perhaps surprisingly, is particularly high in labor-intensive industries.
What is the nature of these adjustment costs? One possibility is that they are simply physical adjustment costs.
Alternatively, the theory of Hart and Moore (1994) highlights human capital as an asset that leads to difficulty raising
external finance, as they are not very good collateral. Thus, since labor-intensive industries are those where human capital
plays a larger role, we explore whether the difficulty experienced in recessions by industries that disproportionately rely on
these inputs might be due to tightening financing constraints in recessions. We do not find significant interactions between
the technological variables and financial crisis indicators, suggesting that financial shocks are not responsible for the results.
However, we find some evidence that the disproportionate negative effects of contractions on labor intensive industries are
greater in less financially developed economies. This suggests that, while contractions in general are not due to changes in
financial conditions, financing frictions could be an important propagation mechanism of the cycle – one which is more
powerful in less financially developed economies – or that there is a persistent shock that primarily affects labor-intensive
industries (such as a labor-augmenting productivity shock, which is usually thought to be persistent in the business cycle
literature). This finding also points towards a new potential function of financial development: the amelioration of
technologically determined financing frictions that are exacerbated during contractions.
Finally, some words on the limitations of our study. First, we restrict ourselves to manufacturing data, simply because
growth data on a large set of countries for disaggregated non-manufacturing industries do not exist. That said, there is no
reason why these conclusions should not apply to non-manufacturing industries, since our industry measures relate to the
technology of production, not to the nature of the output. Second, our identification strategy focuses on the interaction of
4 See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999), among others.
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technological factors with contractions, implying a non-linear specification. This is distinct from, for example, the interaction
of technological factors with growth rates. We find that such interactions of technology with growth rates are not in fact
present, indicating that there is indeed a non-linear relationship between growth and technology such that “bad times” are
particularly informative regarding the determinants of the business cycle. We considered an alternative arrangement of the
results, starting from agnosticism about the presence or absence of non-linearity but, since the regressions assuming
linearity do not reveal any significant interactions, we chose the present organization for the sake of brevity. As such, our
findings provide evidence for two new kinds of business cycle asymmetry: an asymmetric impact of the business cycle on
industries with certain technological characteristics, and the fact that this asymmetry is only manifested during
contractions.
Section 2 explains our approach in more detail. Section 3 describes the data used and the technological variables we
consider. Section 4 reports the empirical interaction of technological factors with contractions. Section 5 concludes with a
discussion of the implications of the results for theories of the business cycle.
2. Methodology
2.1. Econometric specification
Our objective is to see which technological characteristics lead industries to experience most difficulty in contractions. To
do so, we estimate the following equation:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðContractionc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), Growthc;i;t is a measure of growth in industry i in country c at date t. The variable Contractionc;t is a country- and
year-specific indicator, which equals one if country c is in a contraction in year t, and zero otherwise. Variable Xi is an
industry technological characteristic that is hypothesized to interact with contractions. Thus β1 is the differential impact of
industry characteristic Xi on industry growth during contractions. We identify the underlying technological determinants of
difficulty in contractions by seeing which technological characteristics display a significant interaction coefficient β1.
To account for different factors that might affect industry growth other than the interactions of interest, Eq. (1) includes
industry-country, industry-time and country-time specific effects (the terms δi;c, δi;t and δc;t). The specification accounts for
all conditions that affect industries or countries at a specific date, including the state of the business cycle, policy and
financing conditions in the country, as well as any industry-specific conditions and institutional or geographic features of
each country that might favor growth in one industry over another. The only remaining sources of variation to be explained
are factors that affect industry i specifically in country c at date t, such as our interaction of interest.
Since β1 captures the difference in industry growth in contractions relative to normal times for industries with different
levels of Xi, β1o0 indicates that growth in industries with high Xi is more seriously affected in contractions. For example, if
Xi measures labor intensity, then β1o0 would indicate that labor intensive industries grow particularly slowly in
contractions. β140 would indicate that labor intensive industries grow particularly fast in contractions. We discuss later
how particular values of β1 for any particular measure Xi might map into various theories of the business cycle.
The exact methodology for estimating (1) is as follows. Since the number of group-specific effects in this estimation
equation is very large,5 the computational cost of estimating (1) is significant. Instead, we proceed by subtracting from all
dependent and independent variables the mean value for each (c,t), (i,t) and (c,i) pair so that the individual specific effects
δi;c, δi;t and δc;t are removed from the estimation equation. We call these variables dGrowthc;i;t , dðContractionc;t  XiÞ and
dControlsc;i;t . Then, we estimate (1), using the de-meaned variables, and without δi;cþδi;tþδc;t among the regressors. This
yields the following specification:
dGrowthc;i;t ¼ β1 dðContractionc;t  XiÞþβ2 dControlsc;i;tþϵc;i;t ð2Þ
The exact error structure for this procedure is not known so we use a variety of approaches to estimating this modified Eq. (2),
finding that the results are robust. These methods include bootstrapping, allowing for heteroskedasticity using the Huber–White
method, clustering by industry, and allowing for autocorrelated errors. The results reported use bootstrapped errors.
Some comments on our estimation strategy are in order. First, we seek industry technological indicators Xi that are
representative of the technology of production across countries. Suppose for example that Xi represents labor intensity. It is
important to underline that we do not seek to measure the observed labor intensity at firms in industry i around the world,
or in each country or at each date. Observed labor intensity is not a technological variable, as it will be affected by current
economic conditions such as the state of the business cycle at date t in country c, or by financing or other institutional
frictions that could distort firm behavior in country c. We seek a benchmark measure of labor intensity that firms in industry
i would adopt in a relatively undistorted environment – which, when distorted by economic conditions in country c and/or
at date t, might lead to particular difficulty to firms in industry i.6 Following the related literature such as Rajan and Zingales
5 Since there are over 150 countries, 28 industries and 37 years, we would have over 10,000 fixed effects in a balanced panel.
6 Of course, any impact of country-specific conditions on industry i or of country-specific conditions at date t would be absorbed by the δc;i and δc;t
indicators respectively.
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(1998), Braun and Larrain (2005), Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2011), we will measure the
technological variables Xi using US data and where possible using data on publicly traded firms in the US, whose
technological choices are unlikely to be distorted by financing difficulties or by other frictions. We return to this issue when
we define our technological measures Xi.
Second, our identification strategy focuses on the interaction of technological factors with contractions, defined as
periods of slow growth. As a result, an implicit assumption is that the business cycle has a non-linear effect on industry
growth, so that bad times have a more diverse impact on industry growth than good times. As such, Eq. (1) is a special case
of the following equation:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðBCc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t ð3Þ
where BCc;t is some measure of the state of the business cycle. In fact, we find that symmetric measures of BCc;t such as
country growth do not interact with any of our industry technological indicators Xi, whereas when BCc;t ¼ Contractionc;t we
do find evidence of such interactions. Also, of course, both specification (1) and specification (3) presume that there are
common factors to contractions at different dates and in different places. If this is not the case – because there is no common
source of contractions, and no common propagation mechanisms – then we should simply find no significant interactions.
Since we will measure the dependent variable Growthc;i;t in several ways, finding no significant interactions would be a
result in itself.
Finally, any statement about how technological variable Xi interacts positively with contractions is equivalent to a
statement about how Xi interacts negatively with non-contractions. If industry i grows disproportionately slowly in
contractions then it grows disproportionately fast in non-contractions. Since we define contractions relative to the growth
trend in each country, we think that is more meaningful to make statements regarding how industries behave differentially
in contractions rather than discussing how industries behave differentially when there is not a contraction.
2.2. Technology and the business cycle
There are two reasons why particular industries might be more sensitive to the business cycle. One is because the shocks
that drive the business cycle particularly affect them. The other is because there are propagation or amplification
mechanisms for these shocks that particularly affect certain industries.
The different kinds of shocks that are thought to shape the business cycle include technology shocks, shocks to
government spending, monetary shocks, shocks to financial conditions, shocks due to nature (weather, natural disasters),
policy shocks, and shocks to preferences. Each of these types of shock could affect one type of industry more than another.
For example, if the business cycle is largely driven by productivity shocks, the form of technical progress might lead these
shocks to particularly impact certain types of industries. One case would be investment-specific shocks (see Greenwood
et al., 2000) which, by depending on investment for them to have an impact on aggregates, might disproportionately affect
capital-intensive industries, or industries where the rate of investment-specific technical progress is high. In contrast, labor-
augmenting technology shocks might disproportionately affect labor-intensive industries. Monetary policy or financial
shocks might particularly impact industries that are sensitive to financial conditions – see Gertler and Gilchrist (1994),
Bernanke et al. (1999) and others. Justiniano et al. (2010), Justiniano et al. (2011) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012) debate
the importance of investment-specific and financial shocks.
The literature also suggests various propagation or amplification mechanisms for the business cycle. One example is
nominal rigidities, as discussed in Mankiw and Romer (1991) among many others. The most common model of nominal
rigidity is the Calvo (1983) staggered pricing model, where firms generally change their prices in line with the inflation rate
unless they have an opportunity to optimally adjust prices. Yet another propagation mechanism is the financial accelerator
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al., 1999), which might affect industries differently depending on the types of inputs
they use and their ability to use them as collateral. Hart and Moore (1994) argue that asset liquidity determines whether or
not an asset can be used effectively as collateral. They suggest that labor is inalienable, and that non-durable or highly
specific capital are not usable as collateral. If so, industries that use those types of inputs intensively might be especially
vulnerable to deteriorating financial conditions during contractions. On the other hand, Myers and Rajan (1998) argue that
the liquidity of assets could make them less suitable as collateral, because liquid assets might be more easily disposed of
against the interests of creditors, a problem they call “transformation risk.” In this case, firms with more liquid assets might
be those that suffer most during contractions.
Intertemporal substitution is also a propagation mechanism for the business cycle. For example, if productivity drops, the
marginal return to various factors of production drops, leading households to lower investment in order to maintain a
smooth consumption profile over time, leading to further declines in output in the future. This might lead capital-intensive
industries to suffer relatively more in contractions. The effects of intertemporal substitution might also be particularly
strong in industries where capital is less durable, as in such industries reductions in investment cannot easily be offset
simply by holding on to old capital. Indeed, Greenwood et al. (1988) show that capital utilization can be an important
propagation mechanism for macroeconomic shocks.
How can we distinguish between these different theories? First, we need indicators of several dimensions of technology.
Such indicators should be relatively free from distortions due to firm- or economy-specific conditions, such as financing
constraints, institutional frictions or the state of the business cycle. Second, we need disaggregated data, as we require units
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of observation with different production technologies. Third, we need data for many countries, because the sparsity of time
series for any given country and the variety of factors that might interact with units of observation with different
technologies at a given point in time might make inference difficult otherwise. Having broad country coverage enables
conditioning on country-specific conditions for particular industries or particular dates without even having to know what
these conditions are, using indicator variables.
This paper identifies the technological determinants of the sensitivity to contractions by focusing on variation in
behavior across industries, and also across countries. We do so for the following reasons. An extensive literature documents
systematic differences in the technology of production across industries – see Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) for a survey. The
importance of a given technological characteristic for the sensitivity to contractions can then be gauged via the sign and
significance of the interaction of an indicator of contractions with a measure of said industry technological characteristic, in
an appropriately specified industry growth regression. The channels through which contractions lead to slow growth can be
identified by studying how employment, the number of establishments, and other aspects of producer behavior change
during contractions in the industries that suffer the most.
This task requires a definition of technology. Since the work of Kydland and Prescott (1982), theoretical business cycle
analysis is commonly performed within the context of models of economic growth. Thus, we follow the conventions of
growth theory by defining “technology” in terms of the production function. We identify industry differences in the
production technology using factor intensities, or using the qualitative attributes of factors of production – for example,
labor intensity or the durability of capital.
This definition rules out certain features affecting the production process that some models of the business cycle
consider to be important. For example, as mentioned, several theories of the business cycle identify price rigidity as being an
important propagation mechanism for the business cycle. It is not clear that this would affect some industries more than
others based on their technological characteristics, unless the extent of price rigidity is itself viewed as a technological
characteristic. It is hard to think of any way to measure industry-specific price rigidity other than by observing the frequency
with which prices change in microeconomic data, as in Dhyne et al. (2009), but Head et al. (2012) show that the infrequency
of price changes in itself is not necessarily indicative of nominal rigidities. Still, we can assess the importance of nominal
rigidities by first identifying which strictly technological indicators interact with contractions, and then seeing whether or
not those industries display any unusual price response to contractions.
The possibility of rigidities, nominal or otherwise, raises the broader issue that various adjustment costs may inhibit
certain industries from responding to contractions. Adjustment costs could be viewed as an aspect of the production
technology that could be important for the response to contractions. However, we will be able to check whether our results
are consistent with the presence of significant adjustment costs by seeing how different industries respond to contractions.
For example, if it is costly to adjust the capital stock, or to change investment plans, we might not observe firms reducing
their investment in contractions, and we would also expect labor intensive industries to fare relatively well in contractions.
As mentioned our task requires the use of disaggregated data. There are several advantages to our industry-based
strategy compared to using firm level data. First, firm level data with all the variables of interest do not exist, whereas
industry data are readily available with extensive country coverage. Second, there are many endogeneity and selection
issues with firm data. For example, if financing constraints are an important propagation mechanism for the business cycle,
the observed use of any input at a given firm may depend on its financial state, so that technology choice is not exogenous
and the correlation between the observed technological choices of a firm and the state of the business cycle may suffer from
reverse causality. Instead, seeing how contractions interact with an index of the technological choices made by firms in
different industries as measured in a relatively unconstrained environment tells us how distortions in those choices during
contractions (or their inability to modify those choices) lead to changes in growth.7 Firm-level studies may also suffer from
survival bias: the firms most sensitive to contractions may simply disappear from the data when times are hard, and the
countercyclicality of exit rates documented in Campbell (1998) and Lee and Mukoyama (2015) in the US suggests that this
problem becomes more severe in contractions. In fact, we show later that the industries that experience slower growth
during contractions also experience a decline in the growth of the number of establishments, indicating that survival bias
could indeed be present. A further advantage is that, if industry differences in the basic technology of production remain
reasonably constant across countries, then we can pool data for different countries to increase the power of our econometric
tests and the coverage of our findings. Later we will also exploit country differences – for example, differences in financial
development, among others – to identify the mechanisms that underlie the sensitivity of different industries to contractions.
Conversely, focusing on data for one country would not be enough to identify the effects of interest.
7 Of course an index of the technological choices made by firms in different industries as measured in a relatively unconstrained environment could be
used as an independent variable in a study using firm level data also. Still, industry data would be required to generate such a measure.
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3. Empirical implementation
3.1. Data
We measure Growthc;i;t in three ways. First, we use the log change in industry value added, as reported in the INDSTAT3
and INDSTAT4 databases, distributed by UNIDO. Second, we use the log change in gross output. Third, we use the log change
in the Laspeyres production index. Having three different growth indices gives the results considerable robustness.
Furthermore, these three measures tell us about different aspects of industry performance. Value added growth tells us
about an industry's ability to generate income and contribute to GDP. Gross output growth tells us about production overall,
valued at market prices. The production index tells us about production in terms of units rather than market prices.
In addition to industry growth, we investigate growth in a variety of industry indicators to better understand the
channels whereby contractions might affect the performance of industries with particular technological characteristics.
These indicators are: the number of employees, the number of establishments, gross fixed capital formation, and labor
productivity. We also create an industry price index, dividing value added by the production index, and examine the growth
of this price index.8 Value added, gross output and gross fixed capital formation are deflated using the CPI of the local
currency (from the World Development Indicators). Labor productivity is defined as real value added over the number of
employees.9
All these variables are reported for 28 manufacturing industries based on the ISIC-revision 2 classification in INDSTAT3.
We use only countries for which there are at least 10 years of observations. To avoid the influence of outliers, the 1st and
99th percentiles of Growthc;i;t are eliminated from the sample (the same applies to the other dependent variables
considered). This generates a sample of 150 countries from 1970 to 2007, leading to over 50,000 observations.10 The panel
is unbalanced, and the sample sizes vary across countries and industries as some of the data were not reported by national
statistical agencies. Table 1 lists the country sample and the number of observations for each country. Data from 1970 to
2004 are from INDSTAT3, while later data are from the successor dataset INDSTAT4. The United States is not included in the
regressions because it is the benchmark economy for measuring industry technological variables.
3.2. Industry technological measures
Theory suggests a variety of technological characteristics that could be related to the sensitivity to contractions. Below
we list the characteristics we consider and describe their measurement. The different technological measures are calculated
using U.S. data and are assumed to represent real industry technological characteristics in a (relatively) unregulated and
financially frictionless environment. Technological differences among industries are assumed to be persistent across
countries, meaning that the rankings of these indices are stable across countries, although index values in each country do
not necessarily have to be the same.11 See Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) for related arguments.
As mentioned earlier, we use the growth-theoretic definition of technology as relating to the structure of the production
function. We consider the following measures of input intensity and input characteristics:
 Labor intensity: Labor intensive industries might suffer less in contractions if contractions are due to conditions that
particularly affect capital, such as investment-specific shocks, or if capital adjustment costs are important for the
business cycle. On the other hand, they might suffer more in contractions if Harrod-neutral productivity shocks are a
common source of business cycles, or if financing conditions deteriorate in contractions, as the human capital embodied
in labor is inalienable and is thus not useful as collateral – see Hart and Moore (1994). Labor intensity (LABi) is measured
using the ratio of total wages and salaries over the total value added in the US, using UNIDO data. This represents the
overall importance of human capital in production in each industry.
 Skilled labor: While LABi measures the overall importance of human capital for production in industry i, it may be that the
type of human capital matters too. To examine this possibility we include a human capital type indicator HCi. As in
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), we measure it using the average wage bill (wages divided by number of employees).
 Capital durability: Industries that use capital with high rates of depreciation might fare less well in contractions if
intertemporal substitution or variable utilization are important propagation/amplification mechanisms for the business
cycle, as high depreciation would give the users of such capital less flexibility. In addition, in the theory of Hart and
Moore (1994) rapidly depreciating capital is less adequate as collateral, so depreciation could interact with contractions if
a tightening of financing constraints during such episodes is important. Depreciation (DEPi) is the industry rate of
8 This procedure is akin to computing the GDP deflator for a particular industry.
9 We lack the data needed to directly assess the importance of wage rigidities. The INDSTAT databases report the number of employees and total wages
and salaries. Define wc;i;t ¼wages and salaries ðc; i; tÞ divided by employees ðc; i; tÞ. The variable wc;i;t is not useful for identifying or rejecting wage rigidities
because, for example, a drop in wc;i;t could occur because wages drop or because wages are fixed but hours dropped.
10 The exact number of observations depends on the dependent variable. For example in the value added growth regressions there are 57,115
observations.
11 Most of the measures below are drawn from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) and represent averages over the period 1970–2000. Industry measures
computed using the Compustat database are median firm values for each industry unless otherwise stated.
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Table 1
Country coverage and number of observations.
Country No. of observations Country No. of observations
Albania 304 Kyrgyzstan 555
Algeria 980 Latvia 585
Argentina 980 Lesotho 82
Armenia 500 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 112
Australia 1,020 Lithuania 417
Austria 1,034 Luxembourg 1,034
Azerbaijan 473 Madagascar 968
Bahamas 476 Malawi 980
Bangladesh 980 Malaysia 1,034
Barbados 952 Malta 977
Belgium 1,030 Mauritania 168
Belize 952 Mauritius 818
Benin 420 Mexico 980
Bermuda 440 Mongolia 616
Bhutan 28 Morocco 1,061
Bolivia 980 Mozambique 392
Bosnia & Herzegovina 56 Myanmar 980
Botswana 704 Namibia 28
Brazil 1,032 Nepal 196
Bulgaria 751 Netherlands 1,034
Burkina-Faso 560 New Zealand 1,088
Burundi 476 Nicaragua 980
Cameroon 980 Niger 392
Canada 980 Nigeria 952
Cape Verde 392 Norway 1,005
Central African Republic 952 Oman 389
Chad 140 Pakistan 980
Chile 1,055 Panama 976
China 756 Papua New Guinea 588
China (Hong Kong SAR) 980 Paraguay 980
China (Macao SAR) 649 Peru 1,088
Colombia 1,034 Philippines 812
Costa Rica 980 Poland 446
Cote d'Ivoire 952 Portugal 1,028
Croatia 473 Puerto Rico 924
Cuba 952 Qatar 187
Cyprus 892 Romania 753
Czech Republic 417 Russian Federation 473
Denmark 1,034 Rwanda 364
Dominican Republic 980 Saudi Arabia 952
Ecuador 1,034 Senegal 980
Egypt 980 Seychelles 336
El Salvador 980 Sierra Leone 97
Eritrea 417 Singapore 1,047
Estonia 445 Slovakia 328
Ethiopia 501 Slovenia 473
Fiji 1,001 Somalia 308
Finland 1,034 South Africa 1,058
France 1,034 Spain 1,032
Gabon 952 Sri Lanka 980
Gambia 336 Sudan 980
Georgia 79 Suriname 700
Germany 416 Swaziland 644
Ghana 952 Sweden 1,034
Greece 1,006 Switzerland 980
Grenada 224 Syrian Arab Republic 998
Guatemala 980 TFYR of Macedonia 222
Guyana 980 Thailand 980
Haiti 364 Togo 392
Honduras 980 Tonga 336
Hungary 1,034 Trinidad and Tobago 1,055
Iceland 838 Tunisia 980
India 1,007 Turkey 980
Indonesia 1,034 Uganda 588
Iran, (Islamic Republic of) 1,034 Ukraine 417
Iraq 168 United Arab Emirates 840
Ireland 1,025 United Kingdom 1,031
Israel 976 United Republic of Tanzania 420
Italy 1,032 Uruguay 1,030
Jamaica 980 Venezuela 980
Japan 1,034 Viet Nam 166
Jordan 893 Yemen 443
Kazakhstan 473 Zambia 980
Kenya 1,040 Zimbabwe 980
Korea, Republic of 1,061
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depreciation, computed using the BEA industry-level capital flow tables. It is based on empirical studies of the resale
value of capital goods (see Hulten and Wykoff (1981)) and thus reflects all factors that result in the decline in the value of
capital goods, including both physical and economic depreciation.
 Investment specific technical progress: Investment specific technical change (ISTCi) is viewed by some as an important
driver of the cycle e.g. Justiniano et al. (2010), Justiniano et al. (2011). Also, ISTCi is a factor of economic depreciation, so it
could be related to contractions for the same reasons as DEPi. Investment-specific technical change (ISTCi) is measured
using the rate of decline in the quality-adjusted price of capital goods used by each industry, relative to the price of
consumption and services, weighting the share of each type of capital using the BEA industry-level capital flow tables.
This indicates the extent to which technological obsolescence leads to a decline in the market value of capital goods used
in each industry (see for example Greenwood et al., 1997).
 R&D intensity: R&D intensive industries could be sensitive to contractions for several reasons. Barlevy (2007) finds that
R&D spending in the US is procyclical, arguing this is because entrepreneurs care mainly about the short term benefits of
new knowledge because the long-term benefits are likely to accrue to others due to knowledge spillovers. In addition,
Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) show that R&D intensity is strongly related to the industry tendency to draw on external
funds, the external finance dependence measure of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and, as an intangible asset, it might be
particularly sensitive to changes in financial conditions. Furthermore, Corrado et al. (2009) find that intangible assets are
systematically less durable than tangible assets. If so, then R&D intensity might be related to the sensitivity to
contractions because high-R&D industries have less durable assets overall. R&D intensity (RNDi) is measured as R&D
expenditures over total capital expenditures, as reported in Compustat – see Ilyina and Samaniego (2011).
 Asset fixity: According to Hart and Moore (1994), non-fixed assets are intangible and thus may be less easily contractible
or transferrable, leading to a sensitivity to credit constraints. They may also interact with the business cycle if changes in
investment in fixed assets constitute an important channel of the business cycle, e.g. due to intertemporal substitution or
investment-specific shocks. Again, since intangibles depreciate more rapidly than tangible assets, high-fixity industries
might interact with contractions because they have less rapidly depreciating capital. Asset fixity (FIXi) is the ratio of fixed
assets to total assets, computed using Compustat data following Braun and Larrain (2005).
 Input specificity: The specificity of inputs makes them harder to adjust when conditions change. Hart and Moore (1994)
also argue that specialized or specific inputs are less useful as collateral because the secondary market for such an asset is
likely to be illiquid, with few if any buyers, should the borrower forfeit the inputs and transfer them to the lender. If
inputs are specific, they may also not easily be reallocated to other firms in contractions, so the industry would suffer
more due to inefficient allocation of resources or the inability to optimally adjust input use.
One measure of input specificity is the relationship-specificity indicator (SPECi) developed in Nunn (2007). It measures
the extent to which inputs are dependent on relationship-specific investment between the supplier and the buyer. Nunn
(2007) measures, for each good, the proportion of inputs that are not sold on an organized exchange nor reference-priced
in a trade publication. If inputs are sold on an organized exchange or reference-priced, there must exist a large number of
buyers and sellers, indicating this good is not dependent on relationship-specific investments.12
In addition, Samaniego (2010) suggests that investment lumpiness (LMPi) may also indicate that a significant portion of a
firm's capital cannot be transferred (alienated) without destroying value, and hence, capital that tends to be adjusted in
“lumps” is less suitable as collateral in much the same manner as more specific capital. The results of Lanteri (2014) also
suggest that capital specificity is an effective adjustment cost. As in Ilyina and Samaniego (2011), lumpiness is defined as
the average number of investment spikes per firm during a decade in a given industry, computed using Compustat data.
A spike is defined as an annual capital expenditure exceeding 30% of the firm's stock of fixed assets, as in Doms and
Dunne (1998).
 Intermediate intensity: Industries that use intermediate inputs intensively may be particularly sensitive to input price
shocks, and also to financial frictions. We measure intermediate intensity by dividing gross output by the difference
between gross output and value added, as measured in the United States and as reported in INDSTAT3 over the time
period of our study.
Are there any other industry variables of interest? Braun and Larrain (2005) find that industries where external finance
dependence is high grow slower during contractions. Although finance dependence is not a strictly technological variable in
terms of our definition, we do not wish our results concerning the strictly technological variables to be picking up an
interaction of finance dependence. Thus, we include finance dependence as an additional technological variable.13 The need
for external finance is measured using the external finance dependence (EFDi) measure developed in Rajan and Zingales
(1998), who assume some industries are more dependent on external finance than others for reasons such as the initial
project scale, gestation period, cash harvest period and the requirement for continuing investment. The measure is defined
as the share of capital expenditure that is not financed by cash flow from operations. The industry value is that of the
median firm value in COMPUSTAT, as reported for our industry classification in Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008).
12 Nunn (2007) reports a second measure, the proportion of inputs not being sold on an exchange. This “moderate”measure of relationship specificity
is strongly correlated with the “strict” one, but usually performs worse in the regressions than the “strict” measure.
13 In a robustness exercise we also include EFDi  Contractionc;t as a control variable when estimating Eq. (1) for technological variables other than EFDi,
finding that results concerning those variables are unaffected.
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Table 2 reports the values of these measures, and Table 3 shows the matrix of correlations among them. Asset fixity and
R&D intensity are negatively correlated, as expected. Labor intensity LABi and capital depreciation DEPi are positively
correlated whereas, perhaps surprisingly, ISTCi and DEPi are not. The input specificity variable SPECi is strongly positively
related with investment lumpiness LMPi, as expected. Specificity SPECi is also positively correlated with the industry rate of
depreciation. Thus, several of the technological variables are correlated amongst themselves. As a result, it will be important
not just to see which technological variables interact significantly when we estimate Eq. (1), but also to see which of these
interactions are robust when included in the same specification.
Again, central to our identification strategy is the assumption that technological measures Xi are constant across
countries and across time. Regarding time variation, Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) show that the rankings of industries
according to the above measures computed by decades persist over the period (1970–2000).14 Regarding country variation,
it is important to remember that the assumption is not that, for example, LABi accurately measures labor intensity in
manufacturing industries around the world. The assumption is that this indicates the labor intensity of a typical firm
operating in industry i in a relatively undistorted and unconstrained environment. Remember that country- or date-specific
factors that affect a given industry will be absorbed by the indicator variables in Eq. (1). We are interested in how these
measures interact with contractions. For example LABi might not interact with contractions because labor intensity is not a
technological feature that interacts with contractions. Also, LABi might not interact with contractions even if labor intensity
is a technological feature that interacts with contractions in theory, if it happens that labor intensity is easily adjusted by
firms to deal with contractions (e.g. if labor and capital are close substitutes). In either case, deviations from our working
assumption will bias our results towards not finding significant interactions.
An alternative of course would be to measure the technological characteristics separately for each country. We do not do
this for several reasons. One reason is that the data simply do not exist – except for LABi. We computed LABc;i for each
country c and industry i following the procedure described earlier. Then for each country we computed the cross-industry
correlation between LABc;i and LABi as measured in the US – our technological measure. We found that this correlation
ranged from over 92 percent for the UK to 39 percent in Benin. On the one hand, this indicates some cross-country
variation: on the other hand, we found that this correlation was positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in
Table 2
Industry technological measures.
Industry ISIC EFD DEP ISTC RND LAB FIX LMP SPEC HC INT
Food products 311 0.039 7.09 3.948 0.073 0.281 0.373 1.195 0.557 1.78 0.658
Beverages 313 0.048 7.09 3.975 0.039 0.248 0.372 1.29 0.949 2.378 0.549
Tobacco 314 0.801 5.248 3.975 0.222 0.117 0.189 0.815 0.483 2.648 0.357
Textiles 321 0.029 7.665 3.914 0.144 0.458 0.345 1.232 0.820 1.463 0.586
Apparel 322 0.075 6.437 4.369 0.02 0.447 0.134 1.998 0.975 1.084 0.493
Leather 323 0.959 9.266 4.008 0.198 0.444 0.135 1.927 0.848 1.439 0.550
Footwear 324 0.45 8.325 4.056 0.153 0.446 0.16 2.239 0.934 1.156 0.483
Wood products 331 0.052 9.525 3.926 0.032 0.467 0.305 1.72 0.670 1.624 0.596
Furniture, except metal 332 0.015 8.312 4.045 0.155 0.488 0.28 1.381 0.910 1.555 0.484
Paper and products 341 0.062 8.632 3.25 0.083 0.363 0.472 0.902 0.885 2.406 0.551
Printing and publishing 342 0.222 9.745 4.41 0.1 0.407 0.261 1.67 0.995 1.969 0.350
Industrial chemicals 351 0.028 9.646 4.595 0.269 0.241 0.381 1.34 0.884 2.921 0.558
Other chemicals 352 1.654 6.888 4.683 1.951 0.218 0.207 2.13 0.946 2.568 0.393
Petroleum refineries 353 0.055 6.776 3.923 0.057 0.173 0.591 0.763 0.759 3.45 0.833
Misc. pet. and coal products 354 0.059 6.776 3.996 0.186 0.3 0.372 1.042 0.895 2.395 0.648
Rubber products 355 0.064 10.072 3.144 0.187 0.423 0.322 1.098 0.923 2.139 0.482
Plastic products 356 0.088 10.072 3.204 0.171 0.402 0.374 1.557 0.985 1.808 0.494
Pottery, china, earthenware 361 0.107 8.234 4.603 0.503 0.475 0.4 1.292 0.946 1.733 0.311
Glass and products 362 0.289 7.554 4.379 0.115 0.399 0.4 1.755 0.967 2.189 0.409
Other non-met. Min. prod. 369 0.021 8.234 4.754 0.095 0.385 0.48 0.99 0.963 2.072 0.478
Iron and steel 371 0.004 6.578 3.442 0.066 0.477 0.427 0.951 0.816 2.691 0.578
Non-ferrous metals 372 0.037 5.393 3.431 0.101 0.424 0.364 1.245 0.460 2.373 0.681
Fabricated metal products 381 0.052 7.043 3.421 0.147 0.455 0.274 1.365 0.945 2.025 0.488
Machinery, except electrical 382 0.542 8.832 5.149 0.933 0.433 0.195 2.694 0.975 2.389 0.479
Machinery, electric 383 0.543 9.381 4.313 0.814 0.407 0.208 2.704 0.960 2.268 0.443
Transport equipment 384 0.041 10.559 3.847 0.316 0.44 0.264 1.614 0.985 2.815 0.598
Prof. sci. equip. 385 0.942 9.21 4.456 1.194 0.382 0.181 2.79 0.981 2.55 0.344
Other manufactured prod. 390 0.404 10.07 2.996 0.302 0.414 0.186 2.006 0.863 1.64 0.460
Note: EFDi (external finance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specific technical change), RND (R&D intensity), LABi (labor intensity), FIXi
(fixity), LMPi (investment lumpiness) , HCi (human capital intensity) are the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi
(relationship-specific investment) is taken from Nunn (2007); INTi (intermediate inputs intensity) from authors calculation. The manufacturing industry
classification is 3 digit ISIC rev2.
14 The exception is SPECi, for which we lack time series.
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49 out of the 54 countries for which we could compute LABc;i. In this sense, the US measure LABi is not a bad proxy for other
countries.
However, the main reason why we do not wish to use country-specific industry technology measures is that, as discussed,
actual labor use in a financially underdeveloped or otherwise distorted economy cannot be viewed as a technological
characteristic, since actual input use likely reflects distorted behavior – see Rajan and Zingales (1998), Ilyina and Samaniego
(2011), and Ilyina and Samaniego (2012). Indeed, we repeated our estimation of Eq. (1) measuring LABi for each country
separately, finding no interaction between LABc;i measured in this way and contractions, in contrast to the results reported below
using LABi measured in the US. Most importantly, we do indeed find evidence that input use is systematically distorted by
country conditions: the cross-industry correlation between LABc;i in each country and LABi in the US was itself highly positively
correlated with country-level financial development (measured using the credit-to-GDP ratio, to be discussed later): the
correlation is 27 percent and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. This indicates that financing constraints and possibly
other distortions indeed render own-country input use as an inappropriate technological indicator whereas, as found in the
related literature, technological measures in a relatively undistorted environment are more adequate.
3.3. Defining contractions
We require a measure of economic contractions that satisfies certain properties. First, it should be applicable to a large
number of countries for which fine business cycle indicators using high-frequency data are not available. Second, it should
take account of country conditions. For example, we should condition on the trend of growth in each country, as countries
are on different development paths depending on their institutions and on convergence dynamics. Thus, contractions
should be defined relative to the economy's growth path. The definition should also exclude changes in the growth path, as
these are not changes at a cyclical frequency. In addition, we need to condition on the volatility of growth in each country so
as to ensure that our results do not simply reflect conditions in a handful of very volatile countries where, for example,
political instability might dominate the results.
We measure contractions using a peak-to-trough criterion as defined in Braun and Larrain (2005). Troughs are identified as
years when the logarithm of annual real GDP15 falls one standard deviation of the cyclical component of GDP below its trend, as
measured using the Hodrick–Prescott filter.16 The peak year is identified as the nearest year preceding the trough that features a
detrended GDP value that is higher than that of its previous and posterior years. Periods between the peak and the trough are
defined as contraction periods. The dummy variable Contractionc;t is equal to 1 if the year is a contraction, and 0 if otherwise.17
Fig. 1 compares our contractions identified using our definition and contraction years according to the NBER. Our
procedure picks out the same events as the NBER procedure, even if the exact turning points do not always coincide.
As mentioned, we focus on contractions. Thus we are testing for an asymmetry in how the business cycle affects industry
growth, assuming that a period of economic decline contains information that would be harder to obtain at other times. We
tested this assumption in several ways. First, we replaced Contractionc;t with simply the growth rate of each country. This
would imply both an assumption of linearity and symmetry, and would put a lot of weight on a few countries that might not
be representative. As a result, we also tried replacing Contractionc;t with the GDP growth rate of each country normalized by
Table 3
Correlation matrix of major variables.
EFD DEP ISTC RND LAB FIX LMP SPEC HC INT
EFD 1
DEP 0.0855 1
ISTC 0.2838 0.0433 1
RND 0.7896nn 0.0868 0.4605nn 1
LAB 0.0484 0.3895nn 0.138 0.1732 1
FIX 0.0895 0.1805 0.1689 0.3895nn 0.2217 1
LMP 0.4980nn 0.3931nn 0.4077nn 0.6058nn 0.3065 0.7232nn 1
SPEC 0.3274 0.5266nn 0.2851 0.2729 0.3384 0.141 0.4247nn 1
HC 0.2391 0.148 0.0662 0.2394 0.6013nn 0.4503nn 0.2589 0.1171 1
INT 0.2157 0.2213 0.3371 0.4358nn 0.1619 0.5021nn 0.4354nn 0.4150nn 0.2667 1
Note: EFDi (external finance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specific technical change), RND (R&D intensity), LABi (labor intensity), FIXi
(fixity), LMPi (investment lumpiness), HCi (human capital intensity) are the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi
(relationship-specific investment) is taken from Nunn (2007); INTi (intermediate inputs intensity) is based on authors' calculations.
nn significance level 5%.
15 Real GDP is measured as nominal GDP in local currency divided by the CPI. Data are from World Development Indicators.
16 The value of λ is 6.25, as recommended for annual data by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
17 The NBER definition of the contraction is similar to ours, except that it is defined using monthly data and that it excludes the peak, presumably
under the assumption that the conditions that lead to the contraction do not coincide with the peak. We are using annual data out of necessity, so that in
general the shock that leads to the contraction will coincide with the year in which the peak occurs. The alternative of dropping the year in which the peak
occurs in general does not change our results concerning the interaction of contractions with technology, as discussed later.
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the country mean and standard deviation. We did not find significant interactions in this case either which, given that we do
find significant interactions with the contraction indicator, is indeed consistent with the presence of an asymmetry. Finally,
we also interacted our Contractionc;t variable with the cyclical component of GDP growth in order to get a measure of
contraction intensity, finding that results were similar but of weaker statistical significance. These results are available in
Table 11 at the end of the paper.
Since theories of the business cycle vary both in terms of the shocks that lead to turning points and the propagation
mechanisms that magnify or spread them, we will find it useful to try to distinguish between the period of the shock impact
and the period(s) of propagation. We define the following refinements of the variable Contractionc;t . Let the variable Impactc;t
equal one in the first period of the contraction and zero otherwise. Years such that Impactc;t ¼ 1 should be those when the
conditions that set off the contraction occurred. Then, let the variable Propc;t equal one for the periods of the contraction
after the shock.18 This identifies the contraction after the initial year with a period of propagation.
Using these new variables, we also estimate
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβImpactðImpactc;t  XiÞþβPropðPropc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t ð4Þ
This is the same as Eq. (1) except that it decomposes the interaction term into an interaction for the beginning of the
contraction ðImpactc;t  XiÞ and an interaction for the remainder ðPropc;t  XiÞ.
3.4. Control variables
Regression equation (1) contains a full set of indicator variables, for (c,t), (i,t) and (c,i) pairs. Thus we are controlling for
any country- or industry-specific conditions at each date, and also for any conditions that might affect particular industries
in particular countries. The only remaining control variables to consider are those that affect country–industry pairs at
specific dates, and are thus indexed ði; c; tÞ.
First, we condition on the initial size of industry i as a share of manufacturing, Sharec;i;t1, which reflects the possibility
that large and small industries may react differently during contractions (for example, an industry-specific shock is more
likely to be correlated with macroeconomic conditions if the industry is large). This follows the related literature, e.g. Rajan
and Zingales (1998) and Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). Since conditioning on Sharec;i;t1 is standard in the literature, our
basic results do so too, whereas we only consider the remaining controls for robustness purposes.
Second, Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008) find that EFDi interacts with financial crises and, since theory relates many of our
technological variables to the intensity of financing constraints, any of our technological variables might interact with
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Fig. 1. Contractions and NBER contractions in the United States. Contractions are defined in the paper. NBER contractions are the periods between a peak
and a trough according to the NBER business cycle reference dates, including the year the contraction starts and the year it ends. Both are identified in the
Figure using the letter “C” between vertical dotted lines. GDP growth (represented by the solid line in each panel) is the log change in GDP in the US from
one year to the next.
18 Thus Impactc;t ¼ 1 only if Contractionc;t ¼ 1 and Contractionc;t1 ¼ 0, and Propc;t ¼ Contractionc;t Impactc;t . There are 3640 observations with
Impactc;t ¼ 1, and 10,263 observations with Propc;t ¼ 1.
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financial crises. However, although financial crises may coincide with contractions, they are not contractions. Thus, we wish
to ensure our findings are robust to conditioning on an interaction of the technological variables with an indicator of
financial crisis. Conditioning on crises will also be a way of determining whether the results are due to primarily financial
shocks, and whether any asymmetric effect of financial crises on different industries is independent, or simply due to their
coincidence with contractions.
We identify financial crises using the Systemic Banking Crises Database of Laeven and Valencia (2012). We define the
variable Crisisc;t to equal one if the Database considers country c at date t to be experiencing a banking crisis, and zero
otherwise. A year-country pair is determined to be in crisis if there are significant signs of financial distress in the banking
system (bank runs), significant bank losses or bank liquidations, and if there is significant policy intervention in response to
losses in the banking system.
We use the variable Crisisc;t in two ways. First, we use Crisisc;t  EFDi as a control variable in Eq. (1), to account for the
impact of EFD identified in Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008). Second, we use Crisisc;t  Xi as a control for each technological variable
Xi, to see whether the results are driven by crises rather than contractions and to see whether crises have any effects net of
the impact of contractions that might coincide with them. These results are discussed in detail in Section 4.
Other control variables are discussed in our robustness section. They include conditioning on the ability of producers to
take advantage of industry growth opportunities, interactions with trade openness and with government spending.
3.5. Hypotheses
To summarize, we have the following theories of shocks and propagation/amplification that we will consider, next to
what we would expect to observe in each case.
 If labor-augmenting technology shocks drive the business cycle, we would expect labor-intensive industries to suffer
most in contractions if labor is a substitute to capital. We would expect this to be true at the beginning of the contraction,
as well as possibly during the propagation period if the shock is persistent, as is usually thought (see Cooley and Prescott,
1995).
 If investment specific technology shocks drive the business cycle, we would expect capital-intensive or high-ISTC
industries to suffer the most in contractions, since ISTC should be less important in labor intensive and low-ISTC
industries. Some exposure to ISTC would be required for this to be an important source of shocks and, as in Denison
(1964), the capital share is a critical determinant of the extent to which ISTC influences macroeconomic dynamics.
 If financial or monetary shocks drive the business cycle, we would expect industries that use assets that are difficult to
collateralize to suffer most in contractions – such as industries that are labor intensive, R&D intensive, do not use fixed
assets, use specific inputs, use lumpy capital, or use capital that depreciates rapidly – see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
Moreover we would expect this to be true at the beginning of the contraction, as well as possibly during the propagation
period. We might also expect these technological indicators to interact with financial crises, not just contractions, as in
Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008).
 If price rigidity is an important propagation mechanism for the business cycle, we would expect industries that are
sensitive to contractions to display price inertia. To be precise, following Calvo (1983), inflation (rather than the level of
prices) should be more inertial in such industries.
 If financing constraints are an important propagation mechanism for the business cycle, we would expect industries that
use assets that are difficult to collateralize to suffer most in contractions – although not necessarily at the beginning of
the contraction. See Bernanke et al. (1999).
 If intertemporal substitution is an important propagation mechanism for the business cycle, as in models of the business
cycle with agents who optimize intertemporally, we would expect industries that are labor intensive (i.e. not capital
intensive) to suffer less during contractions – unless investment in human capital or some form of intangible capital that
is the main conduit of intertemporal substitution.
 If variable utilization is an important amplification mechanism for the business cycle, we would expect industries that
have rapid ISTC to suffer more in contractions: Greenwood et al. (1988) show that utilization is an important way in
which firms adjust to investment-specific technology shocks.
 If cross-industry spillovers are important for business cycle propagation, we would expect industries that use
intermediates intensively to be more sensitive to the business cycle (e.g. Horvath, 1998).
Further refinements of these theories will be possible via the robustness exercises that follow.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Basic results
We first estimate the basic regression equation (1) using industry value added growth as the dependent variable and
inserting the interaction terms of contractions with the technological variables one by one. See Table 4. The results suggest
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that, compared to normal times, during contraction years growth is disproportionately low in industries that are highly
dependent on external finance (EFDi), labor (LABi) or specific inputs (SPECi), and that experience rapid depreciation (DEPi)
and high lumpiness in investment (LMPi). When we estimate (1) using the output index growth rate as the dependent
variable, we find that the same list of variables interacts with contractions, except that the rate of investment-specific
technical change (ISTCi) also displays a negative interaction. Finally, when we estimate (1) using the growth rate of gross
output as the dependent variable, we find that contractions interact with DEPi, LABi, LMPi, SPECi, and also FIXi (asset fixity).
Thus, several technological variables appear to interact with contractions, the most robust so far being LABi, SPECi, LMPi and
DEPi.
Of course, recalling that many of the technological variables are correlated amongst themselves, some of these significant
coefficients may be due to omitted variable bias, since we only include the technology interaction terms in Eq. (1) one at a
time. Thus, we include all the interaction terms for the technological variables that interact significantly with contractions in
one regression – a “horse race” – to see which if any of these interactions remain significant (see Table 5). In the horse race
with value added growth as a dependent variable, we find that labor intensity (LABi) is the only interaction to retain its
statistical significance, with LABi being significant at the 1 percent level. The same is true when the dependent variable is
gross output growth, except that in this case the interaction of input specificity (SPECi) with contractions is also significant.
In the horse race with production index growth, again LABi and SPECi retain statistical significance at the 5 percent level or
better, but this time external finance dependence (EFDi), investment lumpiness (LMPi) and investment specific technical
change (ISTCi) are also significant. The fact that the production index interacts with contractions for high-ISTCi industries is
consistent with the idea in Greenwood et al. (2000) that investment-specific shocks could be important for the business
cycle. At the same time, the fact that this is not the case whenwe measure performance using value added or gross output is
consistent with models such as Samaniego (2010) where differences in ISTCi are offset by differences in prices. Thus, in terms
of income generated by each industry, or in terms of production measured using market values, ISTCi is not an important
factor, and nor are EFDi and LMPi. This all suggests that, in terms of statistical significance, the interaction of labor intensity
LABi with contractions is the most robust, in terms of its statistical significance and its presence and victory in all the horse
races. Henceforth, we will focus our analysis on this technological variable.
4.2. Economic significance
To gauge the economic significance of these results, we first need a sense of the overall impact of contractions on growth.
To find it, we estimate the following equation:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþβContractionContractionc;tþϵc;i;t ð5Þ
where δi;c and δi;t are country-industry and industry-year specific effects, respectively. The coefficient βContraction then
measures of how industry growth varies in contractions relative to normal times.
We find that value added growth declines on average by 4.0 percent in contractions, relative to other times. The same
figure for output index growth is 3.9 percent, and for gross output growth it is 6.3 percent. All values are significant at the
one percent level. This may seem high, but it is worth keeping in mind that we consider growth in manufacturing industries
only, which are more cyclical than services or agriculture – see Berman and Pfleeger (1997).
So far, the results suggest that the industries that suffer most in contractions are those with high labor intensity (LABi).
Consider an industry with relatively high labor intensity, at the 75th percentile of the measure LABi, and an industry with
relatively low labor intensity, at the 25th percentile. Based on the coefficients in Table 4, the more labor-intensive industry
(75th percentile) experiences a 6.9 percent fall in the value-added growth rate, while the decline in the industry that uses
less labor (25th percentile) is 5.6 percent. The 1.3 percentage point difference effect accounts for 32 percent of the average
fall in growth during a contraction (4.0 percent), so that there is an economically significant difference in growth among
industries with different labor intensity.19
4.3. Shocks, propagation and amplification
Are these asymmetric effects due to shocks, or due to propagation/amplification mechanisms that particularly impact
certain industries? If an industry-specific (or industry-biased) productivity shock, demand shock or other shock is a
common source of the business cycle, then it should particularly affect the industries in question when the contraction
begins. We now estimate Eq. (4) to see whether there is any difference between the technological interactions in the year
the contraction begins compared to the other years of the contraction (using variables Impactc;t and Propc;t , defined in
Section 3 as the first year of the contraction and any other years of the contraction, respectively).
Results with value added growth as a dependent variable are reported in Table 6. There are two important results. First,
none of the Impactc;t  Xi interaction terms carry significant coefficients. Second, the coefficients on the Propc;t  Xi
19 Notice that 4% does not lie between 5.6% and 6.9%. The reason is that LABi has only positive values. The interaction coefficient for the lowest value of
LAB indicates that it grows 1.8% slower in recessions. An industry with the mean value of LABi grows 5.9% slower in recessions. The growth difference
between the lowest LAB and the average is 4.1%, close to the 4.0% estimate in (5). In addition, in our interaction regressions there are several control
variables that are absent from (5), mainly industry shares and any other time-varying country specific factors.
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interactions are similar to what we had before for Contractionc;t  Xi: the interaction of LABi with contractions remain the
most statistically and economically significant. This suggests that the industry results are not in fact due to the impact of
shocks of some kind with heterogeneous impact across industries, but rather due to some propagation mechanism or some
persistent shock that particularly affects high-LABi industries. We conclude that on impact there is no asymmetric effect of
contractions, but that some propagation mechanism or persistent shock disproportionately affects firms in high-LABi
industries.
4.4. Channels
Before seeing how labor intensive and specific-capital intensive industries behave in contractions, it is useful to have a
benchmark for the typical impact of contractions on firms in our database, as measured by estimating Eq. (5) using the
dependent variables other than industry growth.
First, we find that growth in fixed capital formation is 9.3 percent lower in contractions, relative to other times. This is a
significant drop and is consistent with the widely known stylized fact that investment is the most cyclical component of
aggregate spending. Employment growth is 2.5 percent lower in contractions, consistent with the stylized fact that
contractions are times of net job loss. Price growth declines by 0.7 percent on average in contractions. Finally, labor
productivity declines on average by 1.7 percent. All of the above changes are statistically significant at the 1 percent level
except for the price change, which is significant at the 5 percent level. Interestingly, the number of establishments does not
vary significantly in contractions, the coefficient being 0.04 percent and not statistically significant. Thus, a typical firm
reacts to contractions by reducing investment and employment. Labor productivity growth slows, as does price growth.
However, while contractions are times of slow income and output growth, they typically do not result in significant closures
of firms.
How does this compare to the behavior of high-LABi industries? We find that labor intensive industries respond to
contractions via disproportionate declines in the number of employees, labor productivity, the number of establishments
and price growth. However, there is no disproportionate change in fixed capital formation. See Table 7. Recalling that labor
Table 4
Growth Regressions.
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðContractionc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
We only report β1. Each cell represents one regression. The dependent variable is industry value added growth rate, output index growth rate and gross
output growth rate. Indepedent variables are the following: EFDi (external finance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specific technical
change), RND (R&D intensity), LABi (labor intensity), FIXi (fixity), LMPi (investment lumpiness) , HCi (human capital intensity) are the average of 70s, 80s and
90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi (relationship-specific investment) is taken from Nunn (2007); INTi (intermediate inputs intensity) is from
authors calculation. Control variable is the share of industry value added out of the manufacturing industry at time t–1. We identify a contraction using a
peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs are identified as years when the logarithm of annual real GDP falls one standard deviation of the cyclical GDP below its
trend using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The peak year is identified as the nearest proceeding year of the trough year, with its cyclical GDP higher than that
of its previous and posterior year. Periods from the peak to trough year are defined as contraction periods. The dummy variable contraction is equal to 1 if
the year is in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables Value added growth regression Output index growth regression Output growth regression
EFDContraction 0.0202nnn 0.0128nnn 0.0115
(0.00780) (0.00362) (0.00723)
DEPContraction 0.00484nn 0.00448nnn 0.00355nn
(0.00226) (0.00114) (0.00159)
ISTCContraction 0.00858 0.00572nn 0.00833
(0.00536) (0.00229) (0.00556)
RNDContraction 0.00908 0.00144 0.00719
(0.00557) (0.00338) (0.00397)
LABContraction 0.155nnn 0.0822nnn 0.108nnn
(0.0415) (0.0115) (0.0235)
FIXContraction 0.0534 0.00707 0.0385nn
(0.0282) (0.0111) (0.0185)
LMPContraction 0.0188nnn 0.00916nnn 0.0123nnn
(0.00652) (0.00327) (0.00475)
SPECContraction 0.0584nnn 0.0329nnn 0.0437nnn
(0.0199) (0.00689) (0.0137)
HCContraction 0.00806n 0.00161 0.00482
(0.00482) (0.00279) (0.00486)
INTContraction 0.0745nn 0.0374nnn 0.0325
(0.0308) (0.0133) (0.0244)
Observations 57,115 47,455 56,260
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
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productivity is defined as value added per worker, the observation that labor productivity drops but investment does not
indicates that total factor productivity must be disproportionately dropping in labor-intensive industries, or that worker
hours decline (or both).
The fact that investment does not drop disproportionately in labor intensive (high-LABi) industries during contractions is
consistent with the existence of capital adjustment costs. However, the fact that a typical firm does respond by reducing
investment complicates matters. If high capital adjustment costs were important for the cycle, labor intensive industries
would use more of the more “flexible” input (labor) so that, in the face of any shocks, they would be expected to adjust more
easily to contractions than other firms. However, in that case we would expect firms in labor intensive industries to
experience smaller losses in contractions than firms in other industries, which is inconsistent with the results concerning
value added growth and establishments. The same applies to the possibility that the results are due to there being
differences in the substitutability of capital and labor across industries (if labor-intensive industries can substitute more
easily, they may reduce labor inputs without reducing capital inputs much). In this case then we would expect labor
intensive industries to do particularly well during contractions, whereas in fact they do worse, as seen in the fact that exit
seems to increase in high-LABi industries during contractions.
Thus, in contractions, high-LABi industries experience disproportionately low labor productivity growth and establish-
ment growth, indicating increased exit or suppressed entry. While we cannot say whether this is due to low productivity or
low hours, it is noticeable that Samaniego (2008) finds that in calibrated models it is hard for entry and exit rates to
fluctuate much with total factor productivity. While Campbell (1998) finds that shocks to investment specific technical
progress can impact entry and exit rates, such shocks would be expected to disproportionately affect capital intensive
industries, or high-ISTCi industries, not labor intensive industries. Thus, we conclude that firms in these industries are
experiencing some sort of constraint (e.g. adjustment costs) that leads them to cut hours and/or to reduce productivity
improvements, while preserving physical and/or human capital, and which increases the likelihood of exit.
In addition, for some reason, physical capital appears harder to adjust specifically in high-LABi industries. This could be a
physical feature of the capital used by labor intensive industries – although it must be one that we do not measure because
only DEPi is a feature of capital we find to be correlated with LABi, and DEPi does not display a robust interaction with
contractions. Alternatively, it could also be because physical capital, unlike labor, can be used as collateral, and high-LABi
Table 5
Horse race regression.
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþδ1ðContractionc;t  LABiÞþβ11ðContractionc;t  SPECiÞ
þδ12ðContractionc;t  LMPiÞþβ13ðContractionc;t  EFDiÞþβ14ðContractionc;t  DEPiÞ
þδ15ðContractionc;t  ISTCiÞþβ16ðContractionc;t  INTiÞþβ17ðContractionc;t  FIXiÞ
þδ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
Each column represents one regression. Coefficient of share (t–1) is not reported. The dependent variables are industry value added growth rate, output
index growth rate and gross output growth rate. EFDi (external finance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specific technical change), LABi
(labor intensity), and LMPi (investment lumpiness) are the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi (relationship-specific
investment) is taken from Nunn (2007). Control variable is the share of industry value added out of the manufacturing industry at time t–1.The coefficient
of control variable is not reported. We identify a contraction using a peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs are identified as years when the logarithm of annual
real GDP falls one standard deviation of the cyclical GDP below its trend using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The peak year is identified as the nearest
proceeding year of the trough year, with its cyclical GDP higher than that of its previous and posterior year. Periods from the peak to trough year are
defined as contraction periods. The dummy variable contraction is equal to 1 if the year is in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Variables Value added growth regression Output index growth regression Output growth regression
LABContraction 0.139nnn 0.0769nnn 0.0905nnn
(0.0315) (0.0155) (0.0263)
SPECContraction 0.0285 0.0208nn 0.0364nn
(0.0242) (0.00889) (0.0179)
LMPContraction 0.00160 0.0105nn 0.00364
(0.00990) (0.00482) (0.00712)
EFDContraction 0.0127 0.0113nn
(0.0124) (0.00481)
DEPContraction 0.00207 0.00141 0.00102
(0.00236) (0.00117) (0.00210)
ISTCContraction 0.00891nnn
(0.00284)
INTContraction 0.0381 0.0104
(0.0365) (0.0125)
FIXContraction 0.0321
(0.0313)
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
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firms may particularly need to preserve physical capital in contractions as their other assets are not particularly good
collateral. We explore this hypothesis below.
4.5. Prices and the business cycle
What kind of propagation or amplification mechanism might be responsible for these results? Notice that, in labor
intensive industries, prices disproportionately decline during contractions. For the price growth regression, more labor-
intensive industries (75th percentile) experience a 3% fall in price growth rate, while the decline in industries that use less
labor (25th percentile) is only 2.5 percent. The difference is 0.5%. This compares to an average effect of contractions on
inflation of 0.7 percent, so the disproportionate effect on industries with different labor intensity is large. The fact that
there is a significant difference in the response of prices across industries suggests that a common price rigidity is not an
important propagation mechanism for economic contractions. The only way price rigidities could be consistent with these
results is if for some reason prices are systematically more rigid in high-LABi industries. Recall that prices are not constant
over time, but rise always and everywhere except for rare periods of deflation. Also, according to our findings, inflation
declines in contractions in manufacturing by an average of 0.7 percent. Thus, if prices are more inertial in high-LABi
industries, they would appear to disproportionately increase in these industries during contractions. This is the opposite of
what we observe.20 Instead, the results suggest that firms optimally slow the growth rate of prices during hard times, and
Table 7
Channels.
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðContractionc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
We only report β1. Each cell represents one regression. Each cell represents one regression. LABi (labor intensity) is the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from
Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). Control variable is the share of industry value added out of the manufacturing industry at time t–1. We identify a contraction
using a peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs are identified as years when the logarithm of annual real GDP falls one standard deviation of the cyclical GDP
below its trend using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The peak year is identified as the nearest proceeding year of the trough year, with its cyclical GDP higher
than that of its previous and posterior year. Periods from the peak to trough year are defined as contraction periods. The dummy variable contraction is
equal to 1 if the year is in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables Capital formation
growth rate regression
Employment growth
rate regression
Establishment
growth regression
Labor productivity
growth rate regression
Price growth
rate regression
Wage growth
rate regression
LABContraction 0.179 0.0707nnn 0.108nn 0.0890nnn 0.0678nnn 0.103nnn
(0.102) (0.0183) (0.0452) (0.0273) (0.0259) (0.0289)
Observations 34,585 55,486 32,463 54,507 44,618 54,213
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
Table 6
Impact and propagation.
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβImpact ðImpactc;t  XiÞþβPropðPropc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
Dependent variable is value added growth rate. LABi (labor intensity) is the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi
(relationship-specific investment) is taken from Nunn (2007). Control variable is the share of industry value added out of the manufacturing industry at
time t–1. The dummy variable impact is equal to 1 if it is the first year in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. The dummy variable prop is equal to 1 for
the rest years in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. Standard errors in parentheses. nn po0:05.
Variables Value added growth regression
Share(t–1) 2.865nnn
(0.169)
LAB impact 0.0730
(0.0832)
LABprop 0.216nnn
(0.0565)
Observations 22,556
nnn po0:01.
20 For example, considering the model of Calvo (1983), if fewer firms in industry i are allowed to change their price relative to trend inflation, and
inflation is usually lower in contractions (as we find), then prices in industry i should grow disproportionately fast.
Of course this could just indicate that it is low-LABi industries where prices are more inertial, but for such a nominal rigidity to be relevant for business
cycle propagation we would require low-LABi industries to experience slower growth in contractions, which is the opposite of what we observe.
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the industries that suffer the most during contractions lower their prices the most. Thus, the results are inconsistent with
price rigidity being an important propagation mechanism for contractions.
4.6. Channels and country characteristics
It is notable that labor intensity is a variable that Hart and Moore (1994) mention as being important for the ability to
raise external funds. This is consistent with the results above, whereby firms who disproportionately suffer in contractions
nonetheless do not want to disproportionately alter their investment plans. To see whether our results might be due to
financial factors, we perform some further experiments. There are two reasons why financial factors could be important for
our results. First, contractions could be caused by changes in financial conditions. Second, there could be financial
propagation mechanisms – such as the financial accelerator.
To test the hypothesis about whether financial shocks cause contractions, we repeated the regressions looking at
whether firms with different technological characteristics respond differently to financial crises rather than contractions.21
To do this, we define a financial crisis as discussed in Section 3, and include an interaction of the technological variables Xi
with crises alongside the interaction of the technological variables with contractions, estimating the following equation:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβCrisisðCrisisc;t  XiÞþβ1ðContractionc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t ð6Þ
We focus on measuring Growthc;i;t using value added growth. Results measuring Growthc;i;t using gross output growth or
production index growth are similar. Our premise is that, although it is not the case that many contractions coincide with
financial crises,22 if changes in financing conditions are a source of the business cycle then the technological variables that
interact with contractions should interact particularly strongly with crises.
In fact, βCrisis is not statistically significant for any of the technological variables Xi – see Table 8. Moreover, the statistical
and economic significance of the interactions of LABi with contractions are almost unaltered. Thus, the results concerning
contractions are not simply due to contractions coinciding with crises. These results also indicate that problems originating
in financial markets are likely not the cause of most contractions.
To test the hypothesis about whether there is a financial propagation mechanism for contractions, consider that the ability
of firms to borrow depends on the suitability of certain inputs for use as collateral – see Hart and Moore (1994). It is
interesting that to most robust technological interactions – for LABi and to a lesser extent SPECi – are precisely indicators that
Hart and Moore (1994) suggest as being key inputs that are difficult to use as collateral. Thus the significance of our results
may depend on the level of sophistication of the financial system. In a less financially developed economy, financing
frictions might be more severe so that, if the interaction of LABi with contractions is due to financing frictions, the impact of
contractions on labor-intensive industries could be more severe in a less financially developed environment. In a financially
underdeveloped environment, the financial accelerator might be more powerful. In an environment with low financial
development, fluctuations in financing conditions over the business cycle may be more severe since the financial system is
more fragile, which may in turn affect an industry's ability to raise external finance disproportionately.
We test this in two ways. First, we examine whether the technology–contraction interactions vary based on a country's
level of financial development. Second, we see how labor intensity varies around the world based on financial development.
As in Rajan and Zingales (1998) and elsewhere, the country-specific financial development indicator is the average of
total credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP for each country, CREDc, computed using the World Development
Indicators (WDI) database, and averaged over 1970–2007 for each country.23 We also measure financial development using
market capitalization CAPc, computed in the same manner.
We first rank each country according to financial development, as measured using CREDc or CAPc. Then, we estimate the
regression equation (1) twice, once with only the top half of the countries and once with the bottom half.
Table 9 shows that in countries with low financial development, labor intensive industries interact more strongly with
contractions than in countries with high financial development. This suggests that some kind of financial propagation
mechanism is indeed an important aspect of contractions. Moreover, it indicates that financial development seems to
ameliorate the impact of shocks that affect financially vulnerable industries.
We also repeat the estimation with the entire sample, but including an interaction of LABi  Contractionc;t and also
LABi  Contractionc;t  FDhighc, where FDhighc is an indicator variable that equals one if the country is in the top half of
countries by financial development. We found that the coefficient on LABi  Contractionc;t  FDhighc was either not
statistically significant or significant at the 10% level, depending on our approach to estimating standard errors. Thus we
21 Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008) show that external finance dependence interacts with financial crises. However, external finance dependence (EFD) is not a
measure of financial need, nor is it a technological characteristic in the usual sense – see Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). The strictly technological variables
that are correlated with EFD do not interact with crises, and our results are robust to conditioning on EFD. We also find that the Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008)
result is not robust to conditioning on contractions, indicating that financial ability (rather than need) is the dominant factor determining the sensitivity to
financial conditions.
22 Of the 2604 observations that coincide with crises, 980 coincide with contractions and 1624 do not. Of the 13,903 observations that coincide with
contractions, 12,923 do not coincide with crises.
23 We do not use the value in each year as the credit-to-GDP ratio is viewed as a proxy for the institutions that underlie credit growth and financial
development, which change rarely over time, see Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). Indeed, Ilyina and Samaniego (2011) report that cross-decade correlations
for CREDc are high (over 0.70 in their sample of 42 countries.)
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view these results as suggestive and as motivation for future work. However, we also pursue a different avenue to
identifying a link between LABi and financial development.
Unless the elasticity of substitution between labor and other inputs is zero, then if financial considerations are behind our
findings then we would expect firms in countries with low financial development to try to substitute away from labor and
towards other inputs. Since the elasticity of substitution may differ across industries, this suggests that we should expect the
correlation between LAB as measured in the United States and LAB as measured in different countries to be positively correlated
with financial development. Indeed, as mentioned earlier the correlation is 27 percent and statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. This provides further tentative evidence that labor is indeed an input that is related to financing constraints.
The fact that there is evidence of a financial propagation mechanism is interesting because, as noted before, there is no
disproportionate response of investment in physical capital to contractions in any type of industry. This suggests that there
may be financial mechanisms at work other than the financial accelerator mechanism, or that the asset that leads to
difficulty raising funds in contractions is something other than physical capital. This is also consistent with our finding that
there is no interaction of asset fixity with any of the measures of industry growth –which one would expect if tangibles and
intangibles behave differently over the cycle.
This highlights the importance of labor as an asset that interacts with financial conditions. In contractions finance dries
up, and firms that use assets that are not useful for collateral (such as labor and specific capital) suffer as a result, responding
by cutting labor. Payments to labor represent not just raw time spent at work, but they represent the return to human
capital, experience, and firm-specific knowledge.
Given the importance of the interaction of recessions with labor intensity LABi, one might ask whether the results
concerning financial development are due to the fact that financially developed countries are also those that experience
severe institutionally determined labor market rigidities (in other words, there is omitted variable bias). There are two
reasons why this is not the case. First, in fact, we find that the "difficulty of firing" index reported in the World Bank's 2010
Doing Business database24 has a correlation with financial development of only 6 percent. Thus, whatever influence labor
market rigidities may have on the sensitivity to the business cycle, the impact of financial development is independent.
Second, the applied theory work of Veracierto (2008) and Samaniego (2008) in fact indicates the opposite: that firing costs
should be expected to ameliorate the impact of the business cycle, not exacerbate it. Indeed in Table 9 we find that, when we
split the sample between high firing cost and low firing cost countries, it is the low firing cost countries where the
asymmetric sensitivity to the business cycle among labor-intensive industries is greatest, consistent with labor market
rigidity smoothing rather than exacerbating volatility over the business cycle, suggested by the quantitative theoretical
literature.
Labor intensive industries might be expected to display a particular sensitivity to wage rigidity, something that is also
highlighted as a propagation mechanism in certain business cycle theories with nominal rigidities. We obtain measures of
wage flexibility from the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010–2011. We then repeated the analysis
separately on the top and bottom half of countries according to these measures. We do not find that coefficients regarding
the growth variables are significantly different across groups, suggesting that wage rigidities are not particularly important
propagation mechanisms for the business cycle.
Table 8
Robustness.
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðContractionc;t  XiÞþβCrisisðCrisisc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
The dependent variable is industry value added growth rate. LABi (labor intensity) is the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). We
identify a contraction using a peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs are identified as years when the logarithm of annual real GDP falls one standard deviation
of the cyclical GDP below its trend using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The peak year is identified as the nearest proceeding year of the trough year, with its
cyclical GDP higher than that of its previous and posterior year. Periods from the peak to trough year are defined as contraction periods. The dummy
variable contraction is equal to 1 if the year is in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. Control variables is the share of industry value added out of the
manufacturing industry at time t–1. Crisis dummy is computed in the same way as Contraction, using bank credit over GDP time series. Standard errors in
parentheses.
Variables Value added growth rate regression
Share(t1) 2.227nnn
(0.0969)
LABCrisis 0.0244
(0.0945)
LABContraction 0.156nnn
(0.0321)
nnpo0.05
nnn po0:01.
24 The index is measured using notification and approval requirements for termination of a worker.
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4.7. Robustness
We check the robustness of our results in several ways. These results are available upon request.
First, as mentioned earlier, we compute the standard errors of our estimates in a variety of ways, including bootstrapping,
clustered errors and autocorrelated errors.25 The results were very similar.
Second, it should be remembered that the estimation procedure allows for a full set of specific effects for (c,t), (i,t) and
(i,c) pairs, so the only variables we would need to control for are factors that might affect a particular industry i in a country
c at date t. In the reported results we condition on Sharei;c;t1, as is standard in the literature. This term was usually
significant, although its absence did not affect the significance and magnitude of the interaction terms. In addition, for
robustness, we conditioned our estimates on a Contractionc;t  EFDi term, following Braun and Larrain (2005), and on a
Crisisc;t  EFDi term following Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008).26 Our results are not affected by these control terms.
An interesting question relates to whether our results depend on the level of development of the economies concerned.
To examine this, we repeat our analysis on several subsets of our countries. One sample includes OECD countries. A second
subsample includes emerging economies, as defined by the IMF. Third, we study less developed economies, defined as the
set of countries below the median GDP per capita in our sample over the period. In all three groups we find similar results,
in the sense that labor intensity interacts with contractions regardless of our growth measure, whereas other industry
technological indicators do not interact as robustly, and that the number of establishments and labor input are
disproportionately sensitive to contractions in such industries also, whereas investment is not. These results are available
upon request.
Table 9
Interaction of country/industry characteristics.
Each cell in this table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðContractionc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
Coefficient of share (t–1) is not reported. The high/low subsample cells for each interaction term represent one regression. The dependent variables are in
the first column. LABi (labor intensity) is the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011). Control variable is the share of industry value
added out of the manufacturing industry at time t–1. We identify a contraction using a peak-to-trough criterion. Troughs are identified as years when the
logarithm of annual real GDP falls one standard deviation of the cyclical GDP below its trend using the Hodrick–Prescott filter. The peak year is identified as
the nearest proceeding year of the trough year, with its cyclical GDP higher than that of its previous and posterior year. Periods from the peak to trough year
are defined as contraction periods. The dummy variable contraction is equal to 1 if the year is in contraction periods, and 0 if otherwise. CRED is credit to
private sector as percentage of GDP. CAP is market capitalization of listed companies as percentage of GDP. Labor market rigidity is measured by difficulty of
firing index. Wage rigidity is measured by the wage flexibility index. Standard errors in parentheses.
Variables FD Wage rigidity Lab market rigidity
High Low High Low High Low
Value added growth regression 0.110nnn 0.233nnn 0.165nnn 0.175nnn 0.107 0.123nnn
(0.0356) (0.0696) (0.0375) (0.0443) (0.0568) (0.0394)
Output growth regression 0.0925nnn 0.138nn 0.106nnn 0.136nnn 0.0529 0.0997nnn
(0.0292) (0.0545) (0.0312) (0.0317) (0.0456) (0.0324)
Index growth regression 0.0839nnn 0.0790nnn 0.0673nnn 0.109nnn 0.0536nn 0.0725nnn
(0.0129) (0.0272) (0.0180) (0.0196) (0.0258) (0.0190)
Capital formation growth regression 0.251nn 0.00758 0.0296 0.393nnn 0.0270 0.302nn
(0.0979) (0.187) (0.107) (0.125) (0.141) (0.127)
Employment growth regression 0.0791nnn 0.0555 0.0924nnn 0.0598 0.0166 0.0284
(0.0212) (0.0428) (0.0295) (0.0380) (0.0410) (0.0356)
Establishment growth regression 0.161nnn 0.0171 0.156nnn 0.0803 0.147 0.0822
(0.0542) (0.0625) (0.0508) (0.0454) (0.0883) (0.0489)
Labor productivity growth regression 0.0408 0.181nn 0.0974nn 0.0877nn 0.108 0.0879nn
(0.0278) (0.0751) (0.0470) (0.0422) (0.0586) (0.0415)
Price growth regression 0.0339 0.134nn 0.0829nn 0.0404 0.0484 0.0953nn
(0.0269) (0.0621) (0.0389) (0.0445) (0.0581) (0.0380)
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
25 In any case, when we estimated the autocorrelation of our growth indicators using the Prais–Winsten method, the Durbin–Watson statistic thus
obtained could not reject the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation.
An econometric concern is that growth rates themselves might display differences in serial correlation across industries that are themselves correlated
with the industry measures. We found that serial correlation in our growth variables after removing all the indicator variable effects had small values,
ranging from 0.15 to 0.21, depending on the industry. In addition, these values are not significantly correlated with any of the industry variables except
for DEP and SPEC. In particular, the correlation with LAB – our key industry variable – was only 0.19. Thus a link between serial correlation and industry
variables is not key for our results.
26 As in Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008), we also find that the interaction term Crisisc;t  EFDi carries a statistically significant coefficient when we do not
condition on contractions. However, this does not occur if we also include the interaction term Contractionc;t  EFDi .
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In addition, we repeated our analysis using the KLEMS database of Timmer et al. (2007) under the assumption that this
database may impose more uniformity over the measurement strategies.27 We found again that labor intensity interacts
strongly with contractions. SPEC and DEP also interact with contractions in all three growth regressions, but when we ran a
horse race no interaction was significant in this case, which is not surprising because both in terms of the number of
countries and the number of manufacturing industries KLEMS has far fewer observations than INSTAT3. In the KLEMS
database we considered two additional industry characteristics that we could not measure in INSTAT3: intermediate
materials intensity (IIMi) and intermediate energy intensity (IIEi). These were measured as the output share of materials or
energy in the US as reported in the KLEMS database over the period. We found that IIMi displayed a negative interaction
with contractions in the value added regression, and that IIEi displayed a positive interaction with contractions in the
production index regression. However they did not display statistically significant interactions in the other growth
regressions so we conclude that these interactions are not robust. These results are available upon request.
As a further robustness exercise, we considered the possibility that contractions might be correlated with some other
event, so that our results are due to omitted variable bias. One such event we already considered was financial crisis, using
the Crisisc;t  Xi interaction term. We also distinguished between shock periods and propagation periods using the variables
Impactc;t and Propc;t . Another possibility is something that is negatively correlated with contractions. One such event is the
recovery from the contraction itself. If industries suffer symmetrically in contractions but recover at different rates, our
results would incorrectly attribute the recovery effect to contractions. To explore this possibility we defined the variable
Recoveryc;t to equal one if country c is not in a contraction at date t, but was in contraction at date t1. We then included an
interaction term Recoveryc;t  Xi alongside the technology–contraction interaction terms. First, the interactions of LABi and
SPECi with contractions are now the only ones to be significant when we condition on recovery interactions also, once again
underlining the robustness of the results concerning these technology variables. Second, neither Recoveryc;t  LABi nor
Recoveryc;t  SPECi carries a statistically significant coefficient. This indicates that high-LABi and high-SPECi industries do not
recover especially quickly, so the pain of the contraction is not only worse than in other industries but it also lingers.
Several authors find that a factor of the business cycle can be changes in government spending, e.g. Baxter and King
(1993). Could our results simply be due to government spending being primarily directed towards certain industries? To
check this we included in Eq. (1) interactions of each of the technology variables with growth in government spending over
GDP, and with the cyclical (i.e. detrended) component of government spending over GDP. In no case did we find any
significant interactions. Thus we rule out an interaction with government spending shocks as being responsible for our
results.
It is worth considering that many of the countries in our dataset are small developing economies. As such, they may have
factor endowments skewed towards certain inputs, so that their economic structure is skewed towards industries that use
those inputs relatively intensively. In particular, small open developing economies may specialize in producing labor
intensive goods for the global market. In that case, global shocks to conditions in those industries may cause contractions in
small developing economies, leading labor-intensive industries to grow disproportionately slowly in contractions. Of course,
such shocks should be picked up by the (i,t) specific effect. However, Fisman and Love (2004) argue that the ability of firms
in a given country to take advantage of growth opportunities is based on an interaction of global opportunities in a given
industry and the level of financial development in that country. They use the U.S. industry growth rate as the proxy for global
shocks to industry growth opportunities. This approach is based on the assumption that actual industry growth in the U.S.
reflects global shocks (demand or productivity shocks) because the financial market in the U.S. is well developed (enabling
Table 10
Correlation of ERR and ASYM with other industry measures.
Measure ERR ASYM
EFD 0.3378 0.0529
DEP 0.1139 0.2276
ETC 0.0385 0.1581
RND 0.3454 0.1678
HC 0.3109 0.3974nn
LAB 0.0523 0.0312
FIX 0.5464nn 0.5663nn
LMP 0.4766nn 0.3991nn
SPEC 0.2524 0.2747
Note: EFDi (external finance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specific technical change), RND (R&D intensity), HC (human capital
intensity), LABi (labor intensity), FIXi (fixity), LMPi (investment lumpiness) are the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi
(relationship-specific investment) is taken from Nunn (2007). ASMY (standard error of analyst forecasts) and ERR (absolute forecast error) are taken from
Ilyina and Samaniego (2009). The manufacturing industry classification is 3 digit ISIC rev2.
nn Significance level 5%.
27 The KLEMS database has fewer manufacturing industries than INDSTAT3, so we had to aggregate our industry measures in some cases to apply them
to this database. For example, Food and Beverages are separate categories in INSTAT3 but not in KLEMS. We averaged them using value added shares in the
US over the period as weights.
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firms to take advantage of growth opportunities) and because its market is large relative to the world. As a result, we control
for industry growth opportunity shocks by adding an interaction term of a country-specific financial development indicator
and the U.S. growth rate of real sales. The country specific financial development indicator is the average of total credit to
the private sector as a percentage of GDP for each country, CREDc. Industry growth opportunities USGrowthi;t are computed
as the median growth rate of real sales of firms in the U.S. from 1970 to 2005, using COMPUSTAT, following Fisman and Love
(2004). In general, we found that this interaction neither affected the results nor was statistically significant.
Similarly, openness to trade may affect whether or not firms in a given country can take advantage of global shocks to
industry opportunities. Thus, we also condition on an interaction of trade openness in country c at date t with the industry
variables Xi. We measure openness using the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP, as reported in Feenstra et al.
(2005). If the results are sensitive to the inclusion of this term, it suggests that global shocks, propagated by trade, constitute
a factor that underlies the common impact of contractions on particular industries. In general, in our basic regression (1), we
found that our technology–contraction interactions were robust for allowing for trade interactions. Interestingly, trade
ameliorates contractions in high-SPECi and high-LMPi industries, but not in other industries. This makes sense, since being
able to access the global market should increase the liquidity of otherwise illiquid (e.g. specific) assets by increasing the pool
of possible buyers.
5. Concluding remarks
We find that labor-intensive and specific capital-intensive industries suffer the most in contractions. This appears to be
due to a propagation or amplification mechanism that particularly impacts these industries rather than an industry-biased
shock. This is consistent with the structural literature where a variety of different shocks have been found to contribute to
the origins of the business cycle. The results cast doubt on the importance of price rigidity as an important propagation
mechanism for the business cycle. Intertemporal substitution and capital utilization do not appear to be particularly
important for the asymmetric impact of contractions since there are no disproportionate changes in investment behavior
across industries – at least regarding investment in physical capital. In addition, reductions in investment due to
consumption smoothing should affect labor-intensive industries the least – whereas these are the industries which suffer
most in contractions. Also, there appear to be important financial propagation mechanisms for the business cycle. Among all
the candidate types of asset raised in Hart and Moore (1994), labor appears to be the asset that is most strongly empirically
related to the severity of financing constraints, along with specific capital. The results thus indicate that the inalienability of
Table 11
Interaction of industry measures with GDP growth and normalized GDP growth.
This table represents results from the following regression:
Growthc;i;t ¼ δi;cþδi;tþδc;tþβ1ðGDPGrowthc;t  XiÞþβ2Controlsi;c;tþϵc;i;t
We only report β1. Each cell represents one regression. The dependent variable is industry value added growth rate. Indepedent variables are the following:
EFDi (external finance dependence), DEPi (depreciation), ISTCi (Investment-specific technical change), RND (R&D intensity), LABi (labor intensity), FIXi
(fixity), LMPi (investment lumpiness), HCi (human capital intensity) are the average of 70s, 80s and 90s from Ilyina and Samaniego (2011); SPECi
(relationship-specific investment) is taken from Nunn (2007); INTi (intermediate inputs intensity) is from author's calculation. Control variable is the share
of industry value added out of the manufacturing industry at time t–1. We use GDP growth rate and normalized GDP growth rate (normalized with the
standard deviation and mean so that GDP growth rate has 0 mean and standard deviation 1) for each country at year t. Standard errors in parentheses, nnn
po0:01, nn po0:05.
Variables Value added growth regression Value added growth regression
EFDGDP growth 0.0550 EFDGDP growth (norm) 0.000469
(0.173) (0.0118)
DEPGDP growth 0.00689 DEPGDP growth (norm) 0.000293
(0.00869) (0.000594)
ISTCGDP growth 0.0195 ISTCGDP growth (norm) 0.00101
(0.0274) (0.00166)
RNDGDP growth 0.115 RNDGDP growth (norm) 0.00607
(0.171) (0.00992)
LABGDP growth 0.257 LABGDP growth (norm) 0.0122
(0.196) (0.0142)
FIXGDP growth 0.157 FIXGDP growth (norm) 0.00679
(0.399) (0.0244)
LMPGDP growth 0.0534 LMPGDP growth (norm) 0.00259
(0.0554) (0.00319)
SPECGDP growth 0.184 SPECGDP growth (norm) 0.00922
(0.156) (0.00853)
HCGDP growth 0.0146 HCGDP growth (norm) 0.000953
(0.0361) (0.00261)
INTGDP growth 0.0965 INTGDP growth (norm) 0.00485
(0.168) (0.00972)
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labor, and the illiquidity of specific assets, are important determinants of financing constraints. It would be interesting to use
our industry measures along with firm level data to check the robustness of our results.
Aside from the choice of asset that leads to financial frictions, there are several dimensions along which theories of
finance and the business cycle may vary:
1. Theories differ regarding whether financial frictions are a source or a propagation mechanism for the business cycle.
2. Theories differ regarding whether frictions originate from the unobserved or unenforceable behavior of financial
intermediaries (for example Christiano and Ikeda (2013)), or whether the friction originates from the behavior of firms/
borrowers (for example Bernanke et al., 1999).
3. Theories differ regarding the specific informational or enforcement friction that leads to financing constraints. Christiano
and Ikeda (2013) propose four classes of such frictions: ”running away” (whereby borrowers can divert the borrowed
funds or the assets thus purchased), unobserved effort, adverse selection and costly state verification. They illustrate the
importance of distinguishing between these four frictions by showing that they have very different implications for
monetary policy.
This leads to a matrix of 16 possible types of theory, not all of them necessarily mutually exclusive. Without categorically
ruling out any particular type, our model seems most consistent with a strict subset of the 16.
1. We do not find any interaction between our technological variables and financial crises: by contrast, we find several
interactions between our technological variables and contractions. Combined with other results, this suggests that
finance is more likely a propagation mechanism for, rather than a common cause of, business cycle fluctuations.
2. We cannot rule out the possibility that the behavior of financial intermediaries is limited by asymmetric information or
enforcement constraints. However, we find that contractions in general do not appear to originate in the financial sector.
Also, the fact that the technological variables suggested by theory interact significantly with contractions is hard to
reconcile with the absence of important asymmetric information or enforcement problems affecting producers. Thus,
regardless of whether or not there are important frictions at the level of financial intermediaries, there must be frictions
affecting firms' ability to raise funds too, and these drive our results.
3. Now let us focus on models where frictions affect borrower/producers. We have found that industries where inputs are
illiquid (labor, specific capital) grow especially slowly in contractions. If the right class of model of financing constraints
and the business cycle contains the “running away” friction, we would expect these industries to grow disproportio-
nately fast. How so? Myers and Rajan (1998) posit that liquid assets are those most easily disposed of against the interests
of creditors. If “running away” is very important for real assets, then less-specific capital should be less useful as collateral
during contractions, and we would expect labor intensive industries to do particularly well in contractions. Our results
indicate the opposite.28
Thus, the results are mainly consistent with 3 kinds of theories from the original 16: where finance is a propagation
mechanism for the cycle rather than the main source, where financing frictions affect producers, and where the
fundamental friction that leads to financing constraints is related to unobserved effort, adverse selection or costly state
verification. We cannot distinguish between these three fundamental frictions using out estimates: however, consider the
following observation. Presumably in a world where adverse selection is an important friction underlying financing
constraints, industries where adverse selection is more severe would experience greater uncertainty about firm value.
Barron et al. (1998) argue that variability in analyst forecasts of earnings–price ratios indicates more heterogeneity of
information sets concerning a particular firm, and that such variability is an indicator of adverse selection. These forecasts
are available from the Institutional Brokers' Estimate System (IBES). Available forecasts are both short-term and long-term:
we make use of long-term forecasts because the short term forecasts may contain information about the cycle rather than
the nature of the industry. We obtain from Ilyina and Samaniego (2009) the measure ASYMi, the median firm value in each
industry of the standard error of analyst forecasts, averaged over the 1990s. Table 10 shows that ASYMi is correlated
significantly with asset tangibility and capital lumpiness (FIXi, LMPi). More interestingly for our purposes, ASYMi is not
significantly correlated with labor intensity nor capital specificity (LABi, SPECi). We view this as evidence that adverse
selection is probably not the friction underlying our results.
The IBES data can also be used to compute the average absolute forecast error by industry, using the same methodology.
This variable, ERRc, along with ASYMc, should indicate the extent to which there is uncertainty at the firm level in general,
regardless of the source. This could be related to asymmetric information, but also to an environment with unobserved
effort. A world with costly state verification would presumably not involve a correlation between uncertainty and firm
characteristics because any significant uncertainty can be resolved through monitoring (unless the monitoring is
prohibitively expensive, in which case we are essentially back to a world of asymmetric information or unobserved effort).
28 It is worth pointing out that the Myers and Rajan (1998) theory was developed to understand the role as collateral of financial assets, although they
observe there is no reason it should not apply to real assets. It may indeed be that transformation risk is important for real assets: however, on average our
results suggest it seems to be dominated by other kinds of frictions.
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Table 10 shows that ERRi is correlated significantly with FIXi and LMPi: again, ERRi is not significantly correlated with LABi nor
with SPECi. Thus, although suggestive, these results point to models with costly state verification as being the most
empirically relevant models for understanding the business cycle and the role of finance therein, models such as Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) or Bernanke et al. (1999).
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